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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Many may presume that the authority of an international court (IC) is 
evolutionary and largely unidirectional. This article shows that the authority of 
the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) rapidly and 
almost immediately became extensive, but nonetheless remains fragile and at 
risk of decline, and even (potentially) rapid decline. The AB is a young but 
remarkably authoritative IC even though the founders of the WTO did not 
deign to call it a court, arguably in the hope of constraining its authority. 
Particularly remarkable is how the AB almost immediately established not 
merely narrow (litigant-specific) authority and intermediate (membership-level) 
authority, but extensive field-level authority. Such rapid development of 
extensive field authority is arguably a unique case in international politics at the 
multilateral level. Yet this authority remains fragile, and it could decline 
rapidly. 
The WTO’s current system of resolving disputes has been in existence for 
nearly twenty years and builds radically from a previous system under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) created in 1948.1 The 
interpretation, application, and enforcement of WTO rules take place through a 
two-tiered dispute settlement system composed of dispute settlement panels 
and an appeals process, complemented by a peer-review system of over seventy 
 
Copyright © 2016 by Gregory Shaffer, Manfred Elsig & Sergio Puig. 
        This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/. 
        * Chancellor’s Professor, University of California, Irvine School of Law. 
        ** Associate Professor, World Trade Institute, University of Bern. 
        *** Associate Professor, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona. We thank Karen 
Alter, Rachel Brewster, Joe Conti, Collette Creamer, William Davey, James Flett, David Gantz, 
Laurence Helfer, Alex Huneeus, Mikael Madsen, Gabrielle Marceau, Niall Meager, Joost Pauwelyn, 
participants at the 2014 American Society of International Law mid-year workshop, and the members 
of the larger collective project for their comments at workshops at Duke and iCourts in Copenhagen. 
We thank Mary Rumsey for her research assistance. All errors are our own. 
        1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
SHAFFER_1-13 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2016  4:28 PM 
238 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79:237 
WTO councils, committees, working parties, and other groupings, including a 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).2 The AB lies at the apex of the WTO dispute 
settlement system and consists of seven members appointed by the DSB. These 
members serve four-year terms that are renewable once. Although the AB 
members are not formally called judges, the AB operates as an international 
appellate trade court created to enforce trade rules. Today, the WTO’s dispute 
settlement system is arguably the most authoritative judicial institution at the 
multilateral level in world politics. 
WTO members broadly accept the AB’s authority to “clarify” the meaning 
of WTO law, even if begrudgingly when they lose a case. A broad array of 
WTO members use WTO dispute settlement, and the AB and first-level panels 
have issued over ninety thousand pages of highly technical and legalistic 
jurisprudence.3 This was not the case for dispute settlement under the GATT. 
Until the 1970s, the GATT was “dominated by an ‘anti-legal’ culture,” in which 
the authority of panels was highly circumscribed.4 This article explains the 
change from a venue based on political negotiations to resolve disagreements to 
a sophisticated dispute settlement system and presents empirical indicators of 
the rise of AB authority. The article also addresses, in parallel, the challenges 
the AB confronts in sustaining its high level of authority, which remains fragile. 
Part II of this article defines and presents a typology of IC authority, 
building from the authority framework described by Alter, Helfer, and 
Madsen.5 Part III reviews the transformation from the diplomatic–political 
GATT dispute resolution mechanism with narrow authority to a fully fledged 
WTO dispute settlement system with extensive authority. Part IV presents 
various empirical indicators of the rapid rise of the AB’s extensive authority. 
Part V analyzes the challenges the AB confronts in maintaining its authority, 
which shows signs of decline. Part VI concludes regarding the AB’s current and 
future authority. 
II 
A TYPOLOGY OF GATT/WTO JUDICIAL AUTHORITY 
In accord with the Alter, Helfer, and Madsen framework, this article  
defines IC authority as a form of power consisting of two components: (1) the 
recognition and acceptance of an obligation to comply with a court’s rulings; 
and (2) some form of meaningful practice giving effect to such rulings, whether 
involving meaningful steps toward compliance or acceptance of authorized 
 
 2.  Bernard Hoekman, Proposals for WTO Reform: A Synthesis and Assessment, 20 MINN. J. 
INT’L L. 324, 330 (2011).   
 3.  Compiled from the WTO Online Bookshop. See Articles: Nouvelles publications, WORLD 
TRADE ORG., http://onlinebookshop.wto.org/shop/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2014) (listing page count for 
each annual compilation of dispute settlement reports). 
 4.  Richard Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and 
Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 350, 350 (2002). 
 5.  Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Madsen, How Context Shapes the 
Authority of International Courts, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016 at 9–12. 
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sanctions, a form of contractual remedy.6 The typology tracks the degree of the 
authority of an IC in relation to the IC’s audience. 
Narrow authority exists when the parties to a particular dispute recognize 
that they are legally bound by the court’s ruling and take steps to comply with it 
or be subject to authorized countermeasures.7 In the WTO context, narrow 
authority exists when a respondent and complainant in a particular WTO 
dispute believe they are bound by the AB’s ruling in that dispute and take 
meaningful steps to give effect to that legal obligation or accept authorized 
countermeasures, such as the complainant’s suspension of an equivalent 
amount of concessions pursuant to Article 22 of the WTO Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, or DSU).8 Indicators of narrow authority include 
partial or full compliance with AB decisions; payment of compensation; or 
acceptance of authorized countermeasures that end tit-for-tat, retaliatory, 
protectionist actions. The particular dispute is thus settled through law. 
Intermediate authority exists when a similarly situated group of actors 
recognizes the IC ruling as authoritative and responds accordingly.9 In the 
context of the WTO, the group consists of the potential pool of future litigants 
among WTO Members. When the AB exercises intermediate authority, other 
WTO Members will modify or consider modifying existing regulatory practices 
and tailor new regulatory initiatives in light of AB case law. Indicators of 
intermediate authority include citations of AB case law by participants in a 
dispute and by panels; greater participation of Members as third parties in 
WTO litigation because of their concern with the impact of AB decisions in 
construing the meaning of WTO rules for future cases; increases in the size of 
WTO delegations and the inclusion of lawyers because of the importance of 
legal developments in Geneva; evidence of strategic litigation involving trade 
benefits that do not cover litigation costs; and shadow of law effects from AB 
decisions—that is, evidence that nonlitigating WTO members modify their laws, 
practices, and regulatory initiatives in light of AB jurisprudence. 
Extensive authority exists when a larger field of actors, including other 
government officials, domestic and international courts, legal professionals, 
firms, civil society, and academics, follow and argue over the law’s 
interpretation and practice, and accept the IC’s rulings as authoritative and 
requiring a meaningful response.10 Extensive authority encompasses narrow and 
intermediate authority (and thus the empirical indicators noted above), but 
 
 6.  Id. at 7. 
7.  Id. at 10. 
 8.  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, art. 22, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401[hereinafter DSU].   
 9.  Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 5, at 10. 
 10.  Id. at 10–11. It could then constitute a juridical field in the sense used by Pierre Bourdieu. See 
generally Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS 
L.J. 805 (1987) (likening the juridical field to a culture, organized around a body of internal norms, 
assumptions, behaviors, and values). 
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goes much further in its normative reach. In the WTO context, it signifies that 
AB jurisprudence not only affects WTO Members’ understanding of their 
commitments but also broader political, social, and professional understandings 
that inform domestic and international policy debates. Indicators of extensive 
AB authority include widespread use of the WTO dispute settlement system; 
references to WTO rules in domestic political and administrative processes; 
citations to WTO case law by domestic courts and other ICs; public 
participation in WTO fora; casebooks and specialized journals addressing WTO 
law; articles in legal journals on WTO law and jurisprudence; and academics 
teaching international trade law. Some of these indicators may not reflect actual 
changes in nation-state, business, and other behavior, but they nonetheless form 
part of larger interactional social processes over time that help to embed an IC’s 
authority, thereby facilitating narrow and intermediate authority. 
An IC’s authority can be extensive, yet also fragile in light of the political 
implications of its decisions.11 Because of such fragility, just as IC authority can 
rapidly rise, it can also rapidly decline. An IC may exercise restraint and limit 
the scope of its rulings in order to protect its authority, thereby constraining its 
own power. Actors may also limit the scope of an IC’s authority by not bringing 
cases under its jurisdiction. WTO Members’ purposeful omission to challenge 
the legality of each other’s preferential trade agreements serves as a prime 
example of this circumvention of jurisdiction. As a result, an IC may exercise 
authority in only some areas that fall within its jurisdiction. In addition, 
compliance with a ruling does not always reflect IC authority, because an actor 
may, at the same time that it formally complies with a ruling, apply a new 
measure that undermines the effectiveness of the legal ruling. This phenomenon 
of “uncompliance” calls into question the IC’s actual authority.12 
The core research question of this article is: What explains the rapid, almost 
immediate rise of AB authority, and how stable (or fragile) is it? This article 
addresses three sets of contextual factors—institutional design, constituencies, 
and geopolitical context—in combination with the AB’s agency. Institutional 
design issues include the existence of compulsory or ad hoc jurisdiction; access 
rules, such as access being limited to nation-states or open to private parties or 
international secretariats; and alternatives to litigation before the IC, such as 
conciliation and mediation, on the one hand, and forum shopping to another IC, 
on the other hand. Constituencies refers to actors within national governments, 
such as executives, judiciaries, and administrative bodies, and outside of 
governments, such as legal professionals, corporations, nongovernmental 
organizations, and academics. Geopolitical context includes structural, material, 
and ideational power playing out in global, regional, and local contexts. This 
article addresses the role of these different external factors over time while 
stressing their interaction with the agency of the AB itself in the construction 
and maintenance of its authority. The baselines against which this article 
 
      11.    See discussion infra Part IV. 
 12.  See infra notes 171–175 and accompanying text.  
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assesses the rise of AB authority are two-fold: the counterfactual of a global 
trade system without a third party dispute settlement institution, and the actual 
GATT system before the AB’s creation. 
III 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF EXTENSIVE AB AUTHORITY FROM A NARROW 
GATT BASE 
A.  The GATT’s Patchwork Narrow Authority 
To understand the authority of the WTO AB, this article first assesses the 
development of dispute settlement under the GATT, which was much less 
legalized in terms of the scope and precision of legal texts and the automaticity 
of third-party dispute settlement. The GATT membership initially consisted of 
twenty-three contracting parties, expanded to 102 members by 1979 (the end of 
the Tokyo Round), and included 123 members in 1994—just before the WTO’s 
creation.13 The institutional design of the GATT was less welcoming to 
legalization. Under the GATT, the entire membership had to approve by 
consensus the creation of a panel, the selection of the panelists, and the 
adoption of a panel decision.14 Because the respondent in a dispute could block 
the dispute from proceeding at any of these stages, these requirements gave rise 
to considerable delay and, at times, complete blockage of the proceedings. 
The GATT panelists generally did not consist of lawyers and they were not 
even supported by lawyers within the GATT secretariat until well into the 
fourth decade of the GATT’s history.15 The entire membership, in the form of 
the GATT Council, heard and ruled on disputes until, as the membership grew, 
the Council created panels of five, and then three, members to hear the case 
and write the report. The panelists generally consisted of diplomats based in 
Geneva. The panelists’ reports were initially a matter of a few pages, but as they 
became more developed, they continued to use vague and compromising 
language. The result, in Robert Hudec’s words, was the creation of a 
“diplomat’s jurisprudence,” which was case-by-case, and thus litigant-specific, in 
orientation.16 The fact that either the complainant or respondent could block 
the adoption of the panel’s report spurred the diplomat–panelists—whose 
governments themselves could later be subject to claims—to write diplomatic 
compromises that would facilitate settlement. As Joseph Weiler writes, 
“crafting outcomes which would command the consent of both parties and thus 
be adoptable was the principal task of the Panellists.”17 As Joost Pauwelyn 
 
 13.  The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). 
 14.  ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 43–55, 167–82 (1993). 
 15.  Id. at 167–72, 300.  
 16.  Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat’s Jurisprudence, 4 J. WORLD TRADE 
L. 615, 615 (1970). 
 17.  Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the 
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explains, the original GATT was “like a gentlemen’s club . . . . Its objective was 
to settle trade problems, not create or clarify trade law.”18 
The result of this diplomatic infusion into the panels was a narrow, litigant-
specific authority of the GATT, at best, and certainly not intermediate 
authority over the entire membership. The craft of producing acceptable 
diplomatic reports received support from like-minded trade diplomats in 
Geneva, but GATT members (and in particular powerful members) remained 
reluctant to accept legalized discourse or rulings against them.19 In some cases, 
reports came to no clear legal conclusion or guidance for the future.20 In other 
cases, parties could and did block a report’s adoption, particularly when 
domestically sensitive policies were at stake.21 Additionally, even if a report was 
adopted, no effective system of remedies existed. The GATT contracting 
parties authorized countermeasures only once during the GATT’s entire 
history, in a proceeding involving a claim of the Netherlands against the United 
States in 1953, in which the Netherlands neither adopted the retaliation nor 
received satisfaction.22 
Table 1 provides an overview of the number of GATT cases per decade with 
established panels. It shows a larger number of cases in the 1950s, for which 
diplomat–panelists wrote short and vague reports aimed to help settle disputes 
under the new GATT rules. The amount of cases dropped sharply in the 1960s 
in the context of the Cold War and the rise of the European Community (EC). 
In the geopolitical context of the Cold War, the United States often refrained 
from confronting its allies on trade issues. 
 
Table 1: GATT Cases23 
 
Year 
Total 
Complaints 
Rulings
(% of total) 
Settled
(% of otal) 
Withdrawn 
(% of total) 
1950–1959 53 21 (40%) 22 (42%) 10 (19%) 
1960–1969 7 5 (71%) 2 (29%) 0 (0%) 
1970–1979 32 15 (47%) 12 (38%) 5 (16%) 
1980–1989 115 47 (41%) 28 (24%) 40 (35%) 
Total 207 88 (43%) 64 (31%) 55 (27%) 
 
 
Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 191, 197 (2001). 
 18.  Joost H. Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13 (2005). 
 19.  ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 354, 364 (1993) (noting in particular the United States and the EC). 
 20.  See, e.g., US–Margins of Preference (Aug. 9, 1949), II GATT B.I.S.D. at 11 (1952). 
 21.  See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 158 (2d ed. 2008) (noting 
non-implementation and blockage in the eighties and early nineties).  
 22.  Working Party Report, Netherlands Action Under Article XXIII:2, L/61 (Nov. 7, 1952),  
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/gattdocs_e.htm. 
 23.  Robert E. Hudec et al., A Statistical Profile of GATT Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948–1989, 2 
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 18 (1993) (stating that parties could no longer block the establishment of 
panels as of 1989). 
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After the Cold War abated in the 1980s and there was a push for greater 
trade liberalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, some GATT contracting 
parties more frequently used the GATT process, as Table 1 reflects. The 
process also became more legalized following the GATT contracting parties’ 
agreement in 1979 to formalize procedural practices under the Tokyo Round 
Dispute Settlement Understanding.24 In 1982, the GATT Director-General 
created a small legal affairs division within the secretariat composed of three 
lawyers that staffed GATT disputes and became a reservoir of knowledge of 
GATT case law. These lawyers became important for the drafting of reports, 
giving rise to a somewhat more legalized jurisprudence in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.25 A number of GATT reports in the 1980s created clearer legal 
precedent for future litigation, and GATT dispute settlement arguably moved 
toward the possibility of exercising intermediate authority.26 
In 1988, in the midst of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, GATT 
members agreed to make the formation of panels automatic until the Uruguay 
Round’s conclusion.27 The decision was driven, in part, by aggressive U.S. 
unilateral action to enforce the U.S. government’s view of trade obligations 
under Section 301 of the 1974 U.S. Trade Act.28 The contracting parties 
experience under the GATT and their dissatisfaction with the alternative of 
U.S. unilateralism provided precursors for the subsequent leap to extensive 
field authority with the WTO’s AB.29 Yet most of GATT’s then-expanded 
membership did not engage with the dispute settlement system. In fact, the EC 
and the United States were party to 92% of all GATT cases launched, although 
a larger number of countries became slightly more involved by the end of the 
GATT period.30 
B.  Leap to the AB’s Extensive Authority 
The WTO dispute settlement system represents a significant legalization 
leap in world politics in which the AB rapidly developed extensive field-level 
authority. The impact of the design changes that went into effect in 1995 quickly 
became embedded through WTO members’ active use of the new system, often 
working in conjunction with affected private parties who increasingly 
referenced the new case law. Although WTO members apparently believed that 
 
 24.  HUDEC, supra note 19, at 40–55. 
 25.  See Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First 
Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 11–14 (1999) (tracking the strengthening procedural and 
political developments within GATT during this period). 
 26.  William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT’L. L. J. 51, 81–83 (1987) 
(discussing the growth of GATT case load and trust).  
 27.  HUDEC, supra note 19, at 182–88. The decision was implemented on a trial basis starting May 
1, 1989.  
 28.  Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2012). 
 29.  See generally Manfred Elsig & Jappe Eckhardt, The Creation of the Multilateral Trade Court: 
Design and Experiential Learning, WORLD TRADE REV. 13, 14 (2015) (explaining the AB’s legalization 
leap through experiential learning). 
 30.  Robert E. Hudec et al., supra note 23, at 30. 
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the AB would be used only infrequently to correct clearly erroneous panel 
reports,31 in practice over 66.85% of panel decisions have been appealed,32 a rate 
of appeals that provided the AB an opportunity to build a more robust and 
coherent international trade law jurisprudence. 
The dispute settlement reforms of 1995 incorporated five critical design 
changes that enabled this legalization leap. First, a respondent can no longer 
block the establishment of a panel, so that all WTO Members have an 
automatic right to one.33 Second, the time period between the initiation of a 
complaint and the issuance of a panel and AB decision has been formalized.34 
Although parties may stretch out the process and panels extend time periods in 
complex cases, the formalized process creates limits that facilitate more 
expeditious and dependable judicial decisionmaking. Third, AB rulings and 
panel decisions that are not appealed are automatically binding upon the parties 
to the dispute.35 In theory, the DSB can block their adoption by reverse 
consensus36—that is, by a decision of all WTO members, including the 
prevailing party—but this has never occurred in practice. Fourth, the AB 
reviews the legal bases of the panel findings,37 which has led to a more legalized 
and coherent body of jurisprudence. Fifth, when a respondent does not comply, 
the complainant can seek authorization to withdraw concessions in an amount 
determined by binding third party arbitration, which is usually before the 
original panel.38 This decentralized enforcement mechanism grants the 
complainant leverage by strategically threatening the trade interests of the 
respondent’s industries. That economic leverage, compounded by Members’ 
concerns over reciprocity and reputation among the broader WTO 
membership, enhances the likelihood of compliance. 
A number of factors explain why WTO Members agreed to these radical 
design changes. First, the dispute settlement system’s creation occurred in a 
particular historical conjuncture—that of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
collapse of the Soviet economic development model, which took place three 
years into the Uruguay Round negotiations. This historic change, coupled with 
the parallel success of export-oriented development models in East Asia, 
facilitated the rise of neoliberal ideology. The United States and EC (since 
2003, the European Union, or EU) were the unrivaled economic powers at the 
time, and they led the negotiations to a successful conclusion. This structural 
 
 31.  Elsig & Eckhardt, supra note 29, at 20. 
 32.  Dispute Settlement: Statistics, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/stats_e.htm (last visited June 5, 2014). 
 33.  See DSU, supra note 8, art. VI, ¶ 1, art. VIII, ¶ 5.   
 34.  See The process—Stages in a typical WTO dispute settlement case, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s1p1_e.htm (last visited July 12, 
2015) (using a flowchart to show the stages of WTO settlement). 
 35.  DSU, supra note 8, art. XVI, ¶¶ 2–4. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. art. XVII, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 38.  Id. art. XXII. 
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and ideational context facilitated the signature of a package of nineteen WTO 
agreements, backed by formal dispute settlement and representing the 
institutionalization of global trade competition. 
Second, the United States became much more aggressive in advancing its 
trade interests once it no longer had to prioritize Cold War concerns. Given the 
relative weakness of the GATT dispute settlement system and the limits of 
GATT rules over issues of increasing U.S. concern, such as trade in services and 
the protection of intellectual property rights, the United States increasingly 
used unilateral pressures to enforce and advance its interests. The targeted 
GATT members complained to no avail. As a compromise under the new WTO 
Dispute Settlement Understanding, the United States agreed to exclusively use 
the WTO dispute settlement system as part of an overall “single undertaking” 
in which countries agreed to expand the scope of trade rules under the WTO 
umbrella.39 The negotiations over the redesigned dispute settlement system, in 
other words, were conducted in the shadow of U.S. unilateralism in a post–Cold 
War context. 
Third, GATT (and then WTO) members came to accept that there was no 
meaningful alternative to the GATT for trade disputes, even though developed 
countries had earlier considered the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development and developing countries looked to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development. Even today, despite the proliferation 
of hundreds of preferential trade agreements with their own dispute settlement 
provisions, these provisions are not often used. The WTO remains the prime 
venue for settling trade disputes.40 
The above factors are not sufficient, however, to account for the 
tremendous shift that occurred. Factors largely endogenous to the negotiations 
contributed significantly to the AB’s creation. The idea for an appellate body 
developed late in the negotiations when it became clear that the EC and Japan 
would agree that a party could not block a panel’s establishment and the 
adoption of its reports in return for a constraint on U.S. unilateralism.41 Once 
the EC and Japan agreed to make WTO dispute settlement automatic, the 
negotiators addressed how to ensure the reliable quality of panel reports. 
Consensus emerged among negotiators that a review mechanism should be 
created as a check against poor quality reports. The U.S. support was 
lukewarm, at best, on the idea of creating the AB, but in the end it accepted the 
AB’s creation because U.S. negotiators thought that the appeal mechanism 
 
 39.  See CRAIG VANGRASSTEK, THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 48–52 (2013), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/historywto_02_e.pdf  
(describing single undertaking and its role). 
 40.  Todd Allee & Manfred Elsig, Dispute Settlement Provisions in PTAs: New Data and New 
Concepts, in TRADE COOPERATION: THE PURPOSE, DESIGN AND EFFECTS OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS 319, 319  (Andreas Dür & Manfred Elsig eds., 2015).  
 41.  See Manfred Elsig, Legalization Leap in Context: The Design of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
System 21–22 (Nat’l Ctrs. of Competence in Research Trade Regulation, Working Paper No. 2013/13, 
2013) (discussing blocking a panel’s establishment). 
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would only be used in rare cases, would not greatly prolong the process, and 
would most likely confirm panel findings, allowing the United States to apply 
retaliatory measures approved by WTO institutions.42 As Peter Van den 
Bossche put it, the agreement over the AB “was an inspired afterthought, 
rather than the reflection of a grand design to create a strong, new international 
court.”43 
Some of the design rules could, in theory, constrain the normative authority 
of the AB, but have so far been less constraining in practice. For example, the 
DSU does not refer to the AB as a “court,” nor the AB members as “judges,” 
but rather refers to them as “persons” who comprise “the Appellate Body 
membership” and who have “demonstrated expertise in law.”44 DSU Article 19 
further provides that the AB only makes “recommendations” regarding 
compliance, such that the AB lacks the injunctive powers of a domestic court.45 
In practice, WTO Members retain the option not to comply with an AB 
ruling but rather to be subject to countermeasures that rebalance concessions. 
This feature provides some flexibility, so that if the AB issues a decision that a 
Member finds politically costly, it does not need to defy the AB, but it rather 
can accept the withdrawal of equivalent concessions. DSU Article 3 also 
provides that “recommendations or rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at 
achieving a satisfactory settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights 
and obligations under this Understanding and under the covered agreements.”46 
This suggests that Members can use the AB legal rulings and recommendations 
as a focal point around which they ultimately settle their disputes, sometimes 
years after concessions have been withdrawn, as happened in the EC–
Hormones47 case—a dispute over the EC’s ban on imports of meat from cattle 
treated with specific growth hormones—and in the EC–Bananas III48 case. 
These are reasons why, in the words of former AB Member Claus-Dieter 
Elhermann, the WTO dispute settlement system still can be viewed as a “quasi-
judicial mechanism.”49 
Finally, the formal adoption of the AB’s rulings and recommendations by 
the DSB provides both an opportunity for Members to criticize AB rulings and 
an institutional space for Members to be socialized by the rulings. In theory, 
 
 42.  Id. at 23. 
 43.  Peter Van den Bossche, From Afterthought to Centerpiece: The WTO Appellate Body and Its 
Rise to Prominence in the World Trading System, in THE WTO AT 10: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 286, 294 (G. Sacerdoti et al. eds., 2006). 
 44.  DSU, supra note 8, art. XVII. 
 45.  Id. art. XIX. 
 46.  Id. art. III. 
 47.  Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products,¶ 2, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R / WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted Feb. 13, 1998). 
 48.  Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 4, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R (adopted Nov. 26, 2008) [hereinafter EC–
Bananas].  
 49.  Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Experiences from the WTO Appellate Body, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 469, 
470 (2003). 
SHAFFER_1-13 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2016  4:28 PM 
No. 1 2016] AUTHORITY OF THE WTO APPELLATE BODY 247 
Members can use the DSB meetings to attempt to discipline the AB, especially 
if the membership appears unified. Such group action, however, has only 
occurred once, following the AB ruling in the U.S. Shrimp–Turtle50 case 
regarding the acceptance of unsolicited amicus curiae submissions under DSU 
Article 13, to which all participating Members but the United States 
vociferously objected.51 Ironically, however, the actual practice of DSB approval 
by reverse consensus of all AB decisions serves to enhance the AB’s authority. 
The DSB meets every month and most of the WTO membership attends DSB 
meetings.52 In preparing for, engaging in, and hearing the discussions at the 
meetings, Member officials are more likely to internalize the decisions. In no 
other international dispute settlement system do member state officials 
regularly meet to discuss legal decisions. In doing so, they inevitably gain better 
understanding of the decisions and thus are socialized to understand the 
meaning of the rules in light of these decisions. 
C.  The Normalization of the AB’s Extensive Authority: Government, 
Private Party, and AB Agency 
A central question, however, remains: How does formal design translate 
into IC authority in fact? Before the start of the WTO, it was not clear how 
Members would use the AB. The Chair of the DSU negotiations stated, “We 
thought that things would go on like in the past, evolving around the panel 
system; nobody expected that the AB would become as active.”53 
The AB’s authority was established through the normalization (relative to 
other domains of international law) of the use of WTO dispute settlement, 
including appeals, involving all of the world’s large and emerging economies. 
Table 2 and figure 1 summarize the number of claims brought by the fifteen 
most frequent WTO complainants, together with their participation as a 
respondent, third party, or party to an appeal. Although the table demonstrates 
the dominant use of the United States and the EU, it also illustrates the 
frequent participation of an array of countries in the development of WTO 
jurisprudence. Thailand, for example, has participated in a different panel or 
AB proceeding on average every other month (115 proceedings in nineteen 
years). Even economically tiny Panama participated in a panel or AB 
proceeding more than once a year on average (nineteen in seventeen years). 
Normalizing China’s participation by year of membership places it after the 
United States and the EU.54 
 
 50.  Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, ¶ 8, WTO. Doc WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter U.S. Shrimp–Turtle]. 
 51.  WTO Members individually criticize AB rulings but have only done so collectively on the 
amicus curiae issue, especially following the U.S. Shrimp–Turtle decision.  
 52.  Cosette Creamer & Zuzanna Godzimirska, The Rhetoric of Legitimacy: Mapping Members’ 
Expressed Views on the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism  48 (iCourts Working Paper Series, No. 16, 
2015). 
 53.  Interview with Former Chairman of the World Trade Organization Appellate Body, in 
Geneva, Switz. (Apr. 30, 2010).  
 54.  Rate for the United States is above two disputes per month since the establishment of the 
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Table 2: Participants and Third Participants in Panels and Appeals (1995–
2013)55 
 
Country Complainant Respondent 
Third-
Party 
Total at 
Panel 
Level* 
Total at 
AB 
Level* 
United 
States 106 121 114 341 157 
EU 91 77 143 311 137 
Canada 33 17 95 145 64 
Brazil 26 15 84 125 52 
Mexico 23 14 72 109 49 
India 21 22 99 142 51 
Argentina 20 22 51 93 23 
Japan 19 15 143 177 76 
Thailand 13 3 69 85 30 
S. Korea 16 14 85 115 40 
China 12 31 109 152 55 
Chile 10 13 38 61 17 
New 
Zealand 8 – 40 48 22 
Australia 7 15 83 105 44 
Panama 7 1 8 16 3 
 
 
WTO. Rate for the EU is 1.85 disputes per month. Rate for China is 1.1 disputes per month. Rate for 
Canada is .86 disputes per month.   
 55.  Authors’ calculations based on WORLD TRADE ORG., ANNUAL REPORT 2013 18, 74–93 
(2013), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep13_e.pdf. Total Panel level is based 
on filed cases. Panel reports are counted as having been appealed where they are adopted as upheld, 
modified, or reversed by an AB report. The number of panel reports appealed appears lower from 
these figures than in actuality because AB proceedings can address more than one panel report.  
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the WTO’s automatic dispute settlement system, and a stake in building its 
authority.59 With the automaticity of the adoption of WTO panel and AB 
reports, dispute settlement became more certain. As the system legalized, the 
financial and professional interests of these actors became more salient. 
Lawyers prepared legal briefs that they presented to affected private clients and 
to government officials to spur governments to consider filing cases for their 
clients. Countries with less legal capacity delegated the drafting of legal briefs 
and oral argument to these lawyers. In the US–Cotton case,60 Brazil’s cotton 
trade association allegedly paid legal fees of around 2,000,000 USD.61 U.S. and 
EU-based multinational firms have paid much more. In the US–EU Aircraft 
disputes,62 estimated fees are 1,000,000 USD per month and the disputes have 
continued for years.63 
Although only governments have formal access to WTO dispute settlement, 
private parties can shop for governments to bring cases when they and the 
government have complementary interests. Small developing countries 
generally are not well-positioned to bring a case on their own because they lack 
legal capacity to recognize violations and advance claims. However, 
multinational companies with investments in multiple countries do have this 
capacity. 
This process is exemplified by the case brought by Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, Indonesia, and Ukraine against Australia regarding 
Australia’s labeling law on cigarette packages, in which large U.S. and 
European tobacco companies had funded law firms to support the lawsuit.64 The 
situation, in practice, is not so different from cases brought by the United States 
and the EU. In particular, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Indonesia have 
real economic stakes65 due to large tobacco industries and steady exports. Yet 
 
 59.  In particular, to implement the WTO Agreements, section 301(a) et seq. of the Trade Act of 
1974, designed to address foreign unfair practices affecting U.S. exports of goods or services, 19 U.S.C. 
§ 2102 (2012), provided a formal mechanism to force U.S. Trade Representatives to take actions before 
the WTO. 19 U.S.C § 2411(a) (2012). 
 60.  Appellate Body Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS267/AB/R (adopted Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter US–Cotton].  
 61.  Interview with participating actors, in Geneva, Switz. (July 20, 2005).  
 62.  See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft (Second Complaint), WTO Doc. WT/DS353/AB/R (adopted Mar. 23, 2012) [hereinafter US—
Civil Aircraft]. For the newest claims, see United States—Conditional Tax Incentives for Large Civil 
Aircraft, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds487_e.htm (last 
visited July 12, 2015). 
 63.  See Gregory Shaffer, Developing Country Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Why it 
Matters, the Barriers Posed, in TRADE DISPUTES AND THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING 
OF THE WTO: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ASSESSMENT 167, 184 (James Hartigan ed., 2009).  
 64.  Sergio Puig, The Merger of International Trade and Investment Law, 33 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
2, 31 (2015). Recently, the claim brought by Ukraine was suspended. See World Trade Organization, 
Communication from fhe Chairperson of the Panel, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning 
Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, 
WTO Doc. WTO Doc. WT/DS434/16 (June 3, 2015),  https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/ 
DDFDocuments/132459/q/WT/DS/434-16.pdf. 
 65.  Id. Yet to the extent developing countries lack internal expertise within their administration to 
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the funding provided by the tobacco companies makes it possible for these 
smaller countries to use the system as the United States and the EU routinely 
do when supported by legal arguments developed by private law firms funded 
by the private sector. For example, in the EC–Bananas dispute,66 the United 
States was the lead complainant even though it did not export bananas; the 
United States brought the case because Chiquita, in particular, had large 
investments in Latin America, and Chiquita hired private attorneys to help 
develop the factual and legal arguments.67 
WTO disputes retain a political element as reflected in the tendency of tit-
for-tat suits, in which one case spurs the respondent to look for complaints that 
it can bring. Government officials do so to show their domestic political 
audience that they are defending the countries’ interests proactively against 
foreign trading partners, and to create political costs for the foreign government 
as well. Examples of tit-for-tat suits include the aircraft subsidy litigation 
between Canada and Brazil and the United States and the EU,68 and the 
numerous import relief cases between the United States and China.69 As a result 
of these suits, legal wars displace trade wars and, in the process, new legal 
constituencies form to build a country’s legal infrastructure to engage in these 
battles, as documented for Brazil, India, China, and other developing 
countries.70 
The AB has assisted in this process through its rulings. In the EC–Bananas 
III dispute, the AB first held that private lawyers could be part of a delegation 
before the AB when the small Caribbean island of Saint Lucia sought to include 
them.71 In doing so, it helped enhance the sophistication of the legal arguments 
made by governments that otherwise have low levels of internal legal capacity, 
 
define a legal position, the private interests are freer to advance their own interests. 
 66.  EC–Bananas, supra note 48, at ¶ 1. 
 67.  See James McCall Smith, Compliance Bargaining in the WTO: Ecuador and the Bananas 
Dispute, in NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND NAFTA 257, 258 
(John S. Odell ed., 2006), http://www.ruig-gian.org/ressources/dupont-Smith.pdf (discussing Chiquita’s 
business strategies in the context of the EC–Bananas case).  
 68.  See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS46/AB/R (adopted Aug. 20, 1999); US—Civil Aircraft, supra note 62. 
 69.  See, e.g., Panel Report, United States—Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain 
Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS449/R (adopted Mar. 27, 2014); Panel Report, United States—
Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp and Diamond Sawblades from China, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS422/R (adopted June 8, 2012); Panel Report, China—Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on X-Ray 
Security Inspection Equipment from the European Union, WTO Doc. WT/DS425/R (adopted Feb. 26, 
2013); Panel Report, China—Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Automobiles from 
the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS440/R (adopted May 23, 2014). 
 70.  See, e.g., Gregory C. Shaffer, Michelle Ratton Sanchez & Barbara Rosenberg, The Trials of 
Winning at the WTO: What Lies Behind Brazil’s Success, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 383, 383–485 (2008); 
Gregory Shaffer, James Nedumpara & Aseema Sinha, Indian Trade Lawyers and the Building of State 
Trade-Related Legal Capacity, 1–2 (Univ. Minn. Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-08, 
2014); Gregory Shaffer & Henry Gao, From Paternalism to Paternship: The Development of Trade Law 
Capacity in China (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 71.  Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The WTO in Transition: Of Constituents, Competence and Coherence, 33 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 979, 994 (2001). 
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and made it more feasible for them to participate in the first place. Over time, 
lawyers increasingly have become part of developing countries’ delegations, at 
first working behind the scenes and later presenting their oral arguments and 
responding to AB questions.72 Public–private partnerships among government 
authorities, private business, and private lawyers are now common. In the 
process, the WTO dispute settlement system has become much more legally and 
technically complex. Lawyers now frequently make procedural challenges 
giving rise to new jurisprudence, recursively increasing the need for lawyers. 
AB members also had their own interest in consolidating the AB’s 
authority. Understanding the context of the WTO dispute settlement system 
thus also requires an understanding of the institutional interests and actions of 
the AB. The first group of AB members was aware of the powerful instrument 
given to the AB. One candidate to the AB discussed this matter with WTO 
Ambassadors in 1995 during the selection procedure. He remembered that “We 
were asked about the approach the AB should take . . . . I told them that the 
AB was a slender tender plant that should be protected from too strong winds; 
the AB should act cautiously . . . . I think the Ambassadors probably liked 
that.”73 
Another AB Member recalled, “We were aware that we represented the 
instance of last resort. This was an enormous responsibility; we did not intend to 
handle this with levity.”74 Once selected, the first AB members wrote their own 
rules of procedure, because the DSU was silent on many issues. One AB 
Member recalled that this exercise was important for team building and created 
a strong sense of collegiality.75 The rules of procedure also facilitated the 
development of a more court-like system. 
This first group of AB members was careful to construct its authority when 
interpreting WTO substantive rules that at times could be vague and open-
ended. The AB’s rulings abandoned the use of diplomatic language aimed at 
“dispute settlement” in favor of applying the interpretive norms set forth in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.76 The AB often adopted a technical, 
formalistic, and text-based approach, frequently citing dictionaries to support its 
reasoning.77 It routinely and at times harshly overruled panels for deficiencies in 
 
 72.  Discussions with private attorneys representing countries in WTO dispute settlement, as well 
as members of the WTO Secretariat, in Geneva, Switzerland. 
 73.  Interview with a candidate to the WTO Appellate Body, telephone interview  (July 6, 2010). 
 74.  Interview with a WTO Appellate Body Member, telephone interview  (June 4, 2010). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered 
into force Jan. 27, 1980); P. J. Kuijper, The Law of GATT as Special Field of International Law: 
Ignorance, further refinement or self-contained system of international law?, 25 NETHERLANDS Y.B.  
INT’L L. 227, 229–232 (1994); see generally Pauwelyn Joost & Manfred Elsig, The Politics of Treaty 
Interpretation: Variations and Explanations Across International Tribunals, in INTERDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE 
ART (J. Dunoff & M. Pollack eds., 2013) (discussing how international tribunals actually implement 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties rules). 
 77.  See Gregory Shaffer & Joel Trachtman, Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO, 52 
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their legal reasoning or their application of treaty interpretation techniques.78 In 
the process, it further empowered the WTO legal secretariat that services ad 
hoc panels, which are still often composed of diplomats: the secretariat holds 
the reservoir of knowledge of WTO dispute settlement whose technical 
complexity is growing.79 The diplomats chosen for panels, in turn, increasingly 
have a legal background.80 This turn to formalistic legal reasoning can insulate 
the AB from challenge by making law appear to be more autonomous. It 
narrows the audience having the capacity to critique WTO jurisprudence, and it 
further empowers a narrow community of practitioners, scholars, and 
government officials with technical knowledge—the WTO legal field.81 
The AB has also consolidated its authority by striving for consensus among 
its members and by exercising restraint in issuing concurrences or dissents. 
Early on, AB members decided to discuss all cases collegially, even though the 
DSU provides that only three members would be the authors of a report.82 This 
practice continues today. Both panel and AB members appear to go to great 
pains to present the appearance of unanimity—even where unanimity does not 
actually exist. At the panel level, there were only thirteen individual opinions 
and seven dissents out of the first 196 cases (constituting 3.3 percent of the 392 
opportunities for a separate opinion; and 1.7 percent for a dissent).83 At the AB 
level, there were only six separate opinions and two dissents in 119 AB reports 
(constituting 2.5 percent of the 238 opportunities for a separate opinion; and 1.7 
percent for a dissent).84 As James Bacchus, former Chairman of the Appellate 
Body, explained, 
Whatever our individual role may be in any particular appeal, each of us strives always 
to reach a ‘consensus’ in every appeal. We are not required to do so. The treaty does 
not prohibit dissents . . . , the ‘consensus’ we have achieved in the many appeals that 
 
 
VA. J. INT’L L. 103, 115 (2011) (“A search of the first ninety-six rulings of the Appellate Body found 
that a dictionary was cited in sixty-seven decisions regarding the ‘ordinary meaning’ of a term 
(constituting 70% of these Appellate Body rulings).”).  
 78.  The Appellate Body modifies or reverses portions of around 85% of panel reports. Michel 
Cartland, Gérard Depayre & Jan Woznowski, Is Something Going Wrong in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement?, 46 J. WORLD TRADE 979, 987, 989 (2012). 
 79.  Weiler, supra note 17, at 205–06. 
 80.  Jose Augusto Fontoura Costa, Comparing WTO Panelists and ICSID Arbitrators: The 
Creation of International Legal Fields 14–16 (Oñati Socio-Legal Series, Vol. 1, No. 4, 2011),  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1832382.  
 81.  See generally Sol Picciotto, The WTO’s Appellate Body: Legal Formalism as a Legitimation of 
Global Governance, 18 GOVERNANCE 477 (2005) (describing the legalization of the AB through its 
interpretive techniques). 
 82.  DSU, supra note 8, art. XVII, ¶ 1; see also Ehlermann, supra note 49, at 477 (describing the 
system of exchange of views among all seven Appellate Body members).   
 83.  Calculation by authors. Information on dissents is available at WORLDTRADELAW.NET, 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2015). 
 84.  Id. In contrast, dissents and separate opinions are a common practice before the International 
Court of Justice as well as investor–state tribunals. For an excellent analysis, see Jeffrey Dunoff & 
Mark Pollack, International Judicial Dissent: Causes and Consequences (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author), https://eustudies.org/conference/papers/download/84. 
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 have been made, thus far, to the Appellate Body has not always been achieved 
easily.
85
 
Even where there are separate opinions, DSU Articles 14.3 and 17.1 require 
them to be anonymous.86 Were the practice otherwise, the hermeneutic power 
of the AB could be reduced because opinions would more easily be identified 
with individual AB members. By wrapping their rulings in textual and technical 
reasoning and consensus decisions, the AB members enhance their authority as 
upholders of the law. 
The AB has also exercised agency to enhance its authority by directing its 
decisions toward administrative bodies instead of legislatures. In a number of 
cases, with the U.S. Shrimp–Turtle case and the EU–GMO87 cases being notable 
examples, the AB and panels respectively found that, although the U.S. and EU 
legislation did not violate WTO rules, the U.S. and EU regulatory practices did. 
Thus, to comply, the United States and EU did not need to go back to their 
legislatures to change the law, but could instead come into compliance through 
revising their administrative practices. Similarly, in the US–Section 301 Trade 
Act case,88 the panel found that U.S. statements and administrative practice 
demonstrated provisionally that the U.S. Section 301 did not need to be revised 
so long as the United States administered its law in compliance with DSU 
Article 23, which prohibits unilateral action outside of DSU procedures.89 
To establish extensive authority, the AB not only had to earn the trust of 
WTO Members, but it also had to face systemic challenges from civil society.  
The mass anti-globalization protests against the WTO—starting with the 1999 
WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle—often singled out AB decisions.90 The AB 
responded to those challenges in a number of ways. 
First, the AB accepts amicus briefs from any nongovernmental organization, 
provided that the brief meets certain criteria. When the AB wrote formal 
criteria it was severely criticized by the WTO membership for failing to adhere 
to the DSU (with only the United States supporting it), but the AB’s continuing 
acceptance of amicus briefs evidences AB’s support for this practice. Even 
though the AB has never formally referenced amicus briefs in its decisions, 
interviewees state that the AB reads them and thus is subject to the persuasive 
force they might have.91 
Second, although WTO rules provide that AB hearings are to be 
 
 85.  James Bacchus, Table Talk: Around the Table of the Appellate Body of the World Trade 
Organization, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1021, 1029–30 (2002). 
 86.  See DSU, supra note 8, art. XIV, ¶ 3 , art. XVII, ¶ 1.  
 87.  Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, ¶¶ 8.4–8.10, WTO Doc. WT/DS291/R / WT/DS292/R / WT/DS293/R (adopted Nov. 
21, 2006). 
 88.  Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS152/R (adopted Jan. 27, 2000).  
 89.  DSU, supra note 8, art. XXIII.  
 90.  See Michael J. Trebilcoc, Critiquing the Critics of Economic Globalization, 1 J. INT’L L. & 
INT’L REL. 213, 213 n.2 (2004–2005) (citing newspaper articles). 
 91.  Discussions with former members of the AB secretariat and AB members over time. 
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confidential,92 the panels and the AB have opened them to the public when the 
litigants agree. So far, a small but increasing group of Members, including the 
United States, EU, Australia, Canada, Chinese Taipei, Japan, Ecuador, Brazil, 
and Mexico, have agreed to open hearings so that the general public can watch 
them by closed-circuit television. This practice once more makes the 
proceedings appear to be more transparent and legalistic and thus (potentially) 
less objectionable. It also broadens knowledge of WTO proceedings among 
non-state actors. 
Third, the AB has interpreted WTO rules in a manner that is much more 
sensitive to environmental and public morals defenses than earlier GATT 
panels.93 In this way, the AB’s modified approach to defenses has defused some 
of the public critique of nongovernmental actors against WTO rulings being 
biased in favor of trade concerns over regulatory ones. 
A number of WTO Members have complemented these actions by making 
their submissions to panels and the AB publicly available. Some WTO 
members, such as the United States, the EU, and Canada, make their 
submissions public as a matter of policy. Others such as Brazil and Mexico 
publish submissions on a case-by-case basis.94 Such actions place greater 
pressure on other governments to create formal and informal mechanisms to 
make government decisionmaking in WTO dispute settlement more 
transparent to affected stakeholders.95 Brazil, for example, was among the 
strongest critics of the AB decision to accept amicus briefs in the U.S. Shrimp–
Turtle case,96 but Brazil then decided to attach an amicus brief of a group of 
NGOs to support its defense in the Brazil–Tyres case,97 a dispute involving 
measures that affected the export of retreaded tyres from the EU to Brazil. 
Brazil’s defense was successful on the basis of environmental and health 
protection arguments,98 and the country has subsequently made its filings 
publicly available. 
 
 92.  DSU, supra note 8, art. XVII, ¶ 9. 
 93.  See Report of the Panel, GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 
DS29/R (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT BISD (39th Supp.), para. 5.8-5.14; Appellate Body Report, United 
States—Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp & Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article  21.5 of DSU by 
Malasya, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted Nov.. 21, 2001) paras. 124-131; see also Robert 
Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and 
Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 491, 503, 505 (2002) (discussing Shrimp–Turtle dispute) 
 94.  The United States and the EU aim to make their submissions public as they give them to the 
panel. Canada makes them public after the dispute is over. Mexico’s practice is case-by-case and has 
been changing, including in relation to the practices of its opponent. This is confirmed by e-mails with a 
representative of each country. See Gabrielle Marceau & Mikella Hurley, Transparency and Public 
Participation in the WTO: A Report Card on WTO Transparency Mechanisms 4 TRADE L. & DEV. 19, 
26 (2012). 
 95.  See, e.g., Shaffer, Nedumpara & Sinha, supra note 70; Shaffer, Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra 
note 70. 
 96.  U.S. Shrimp–Turtle, supra note 50.  
 97.  Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 17, 2007). 
 98.  Id. at ¶ 258. 
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IV 
INDICATORS OF NARROW, INTERMEDIATE, AND EXTENSIVE AB AUTHORITY 
The AB very rapidly consolidated extensive (field-level) authority that 
incorporates narrow (litigant-specific) and intermediate (member-level) 
authority, which is unique in international politics at the multilateral level. This 
part presents specific indicators of this development. 
The use of the WTO dispute settlement system quickly became increasingly 
normalized compared to GATT dispute settlement. Formal complaints and 
formal panel and AB decisions are much more frequent. The fact that a much 
wider array of parties brings complaints and more parties are respondents to 
complaints means that even if the AB were to have only narrow, litigant-
specific authority, many more countries would still be affected. Overall, sixty-six 
WTO Members have been a party to a WTO dispute (as a complainant or 
respondent) and another thirty-five Members have been a third party, such that, 
in total, 101 Members have participated as a party or third party in WTO 
dispute settlement.99 This constitutes, to our knowledge, the broadest use of any 
IC by states ever and is an indicator of the AB’s extensive authority in the field. 
To help overcome the challenges for developing countries, a group of WTO 
Members funded the creation of an Advisory Center on WTO Law (ACWL) in 
2001, which offers free legal advice and subsidized assistance in dispute 
settlement proceedings. Since its creation, the ACWL, when acting on behalf of 
developing countries, has been the third most active complainant within the 
WTO dispute settlement system, after the United States and the EU, providing 
support in forty-four WTO dispute settlement proceedings, which constitutes 
around one-fifth of proceedings initiated since 2001.100 Since 2000, developing 
countries—the beneficiaries of the ACWL—have brought nearly 50% of WTO 
cases.101 
Policy changes, whether involving compliance, or in the alternative a 
settlement more favorable to the complainant than the status quo, are a second 
important indicator of litigant-specific authority. They are difficult to measure, 
but WTO compliance rates, at least formally, appear to be high for an IC.102 
Complainants sought compliance actions (pursuant to DSU Article 21.5 
proceedings) in only twenty-seven of the first 104 decisions (constituting 25%) 
and sought retaliation authorization in only nineteen cases (just 18%) through 
 
 99.  Authors’ calculation based on WTO data, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_ 
by_country_e.htm (as of end of 2014).  
 100.  E-mail from member of the  Advisory Centre on WTO Law, to Gregory Shaffer, Chancellor’s 
Professor, Irvine School of Law (May 7, 2014) (on file with author). 
 101.  Authors’ calculation based on WTO data, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
dispu_status_e.htm (as of end of 2013).  
 102.  Bruce Wilson, former director of the WTO Legal Secretariat, found the following: “In virtually 
all of these cases the WTO Member found to be in violation has indicated its intention to bring itself 
into compliance and the record indicates that in most cases has already done so.” Bruce Wilson, 
Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings: The Record to Date, 10 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 397, 397 (2007).  
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2013.103 When Members sought retaliation, they eventually reached legal 
settlement in a large number of these cases. Such legal settlement involved 
acceptance of the retaliation; steps taken toward expanding market access, as in 
the EC–Bananas III case104 and EC–Meat Hormones case;105 or the provision of 
other compensatory benefits, such as in the US–Cotton106 and US–Clove 
Cigarettes cases.107 Moreover, if the AB exercised no narrow authority that led 
to some meaningful policy change, it is doubtful that such a broad array of 
WTO Members would use the system. 
The AB has gained much more than narrow authority to help resolve ad hoc 
disputes between litigating Members. It has created a jurisprudence that WTO 
Members engaged in substantial trade realize they must understand and 
attempt to shape because that jurisprudence has future implications for their 
trading interests. Members’ participation as third parties in adjudications before 
the AB indicates this awareness of WTO jurisprudence’s importance for policy 
choices. Indeed, there would be no reason for Members to join as third parties 
if they had no systemic concerns that such decisions would matter for future 
cases and thus for assessing domestic policy options. The United States has 
been, in practice, a party or third party in every case that resulted in a panel or 
AB decision.108 The EU has been a party or third party in over 94% of such 
decisions.109 In the WTO’s early days, the United States and the EU stood out as 
frequent third-party participants. Soon, however, other countries recognized the 
importance of third-party participation. China, India, and Brazil, for example, 
were a third party in 109, 100, and 84 cases respectively, and 83 WTO Members 
have been a third party in at least one case.110 In contrast, thirty-two GATT 
Contracting Parties have acted as a third party in a GATT dispute during the 
GATT’s forty-eight-year history.111 
Once again, the AB exercised agency in facilitating such third-party 
 
 103.  Authors’ calculations based on information on article 22.6 proceedings, http://www.worldtrade 
law.net/databases/suspensionawards.php. 
 104.  EC–Bananas, supra note 48 ¶ 129. 
 105.  Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), ¶ 
246, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R / WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 1998); Appellate Body Report, 
United States—Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC–Hormones Dispute, ¶ 116, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS320/AB/R (adopted Oct. 16, 2008). 
 106.  US–Cotton, supra note 60, ¶ 258. 
 107.  Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove 
Cigarettes, ¶ 83, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted Apr. 4, 2012). 
 108.  See Adopted Panel Reports within the Framework of GATT 1947, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm (last visited May, 21 2014) (listing all 
publicly available GATT panel reports). For the odd instance in which the United States was a party in 
a case rather than a third party in a separate case, such as in the multiple cases regarding EC–Bananas, 
we count the United States as a participant because otherwise the figures would misleadingly suggest 
that the United States was not engaged with the WTO case. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. (based on information available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_ 
dispu_documents_e.htm (as of 2014)). 
 111.  Id. (based on review of all adopted GATT panel reports).  
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participation. DSU Article 10 provides that a WTO member can be a third 
party, pursuant to which it can “be heard by the panel and . . . make written 
submissions to the panel,” when it has “a substantial interest in a matter before 
a panel.”112 The AB has interpreted this provision liberally and, in the EC–
Sardines case,113 even let Morocco exercise de facto third-party-type rights by 
filing an amicus curiae brief when Morocco had failed to reserve its third-party 
rights before the panel.114 In doing so, the AB has facilitated an increase in 
Member engagement and broadened the range of arguments and perspectives 
that it hears. 
Recognizing the implications of WTO law, Members have significantly 
increased the size of their delegations in Geneva from an average of less than 
three representatives per Member in 1982 to an average of just under six 
representatives per Member in 2009, as shown in Figure 2. Many Members have 
established specialized trade law divisions or hired internal legal counselors for 
the first time.115 These delegations’ legal counselors regularly attend discussions 
regarding WTO case law. In Geneva, the ACWL, Sidley Austin LLP, and the 
NGO International Centre on Trade and Sustainable Development each 
regularly organizes meetings to analyze AB decisions. In addition, several 
governments including Brazil, China, and India have organized and participated 
in discussion groups domestically.116 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 112.  DSU, supra note 8, art. X.  
 113.  Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, ¶¶ 161–62, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS231/AB/R(adopted Oct. 23, 2002).  
 114.  Panel Report, EC—Trade Description of Sardines (Peru), WT/DS231 (adopted May 29, 2002); 
see also James McCall Smith, WTO Dispute Settlement: The Politics of Procedure in Appellate Body 
Rulings, 2 WORLD TRADE REV. 65, 80 (2003). 
 115.  See generally DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AT THE WTO: THE DEVELOPING COUNTRY 
EXPERIENCE (Gregory C. Shaffer & Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz eds., 2008) (providing case studies of 
developing countries). 
 116.  See, e.g., Shaffer, Ratton Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra note 70, at 392; Shaffer, Nedumpara & 
Sinha, supra note 70, at 13.   
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law. Although AB decisions have no formal stare decisis effect, panel and AB 
reports regularly cite prior panel and AB decisions. In the EC–Seal Products 
dispute, for example, the AB cited sixty-seven former panel and AB decisions 
to support its interpretation of WTO texts.120 Joost Pauwelyn finds that 35.4% of 
AB decisions cross-reference each other, thus forming a “large and dense” body 
of precedent.121 A clear and functioning hierarchy can be deduced from panels’ 
recurrent following of AB decisions. Following previously adopted AB reports 
addressing the same issues promotes a coherent and predictable body of 
jurisprudence. In only one case, involving the controversial use of an 
administrative practice known as zeroing by the United States in antidumping 
procedures, did the AB find it necessary to reprimand a panel for failing to 
follow previous AB jurisprudence.122 Panels have fallen in line and regularly cite 
AB jurisprudence in support of their decisions. 
Complainants and respondents, in turn, know they must cite AB 
jurisprudence in their submissions to support their legal arguments. The 
submissions of several members such as the United States, the EU, Brazil, 
Australia, Japan, and Mexico are publicly available, and they are full of 
citations to AB reports. Twenty randomly chosen submissions, including 
submissions prepared by the ACWL, cite a median of seventeen and one-half 
and an average of twenty-one separate panel and AB decisions. Moreover, 
private parties cite to AB jurisprudence as well when they attempt to persuade 
governments to bring a WTO case, writing sample briefs that a government can 
adopt wholesale or from which the government can cut and paste.123 Private 
parties at times write amicus curiae briefs for which our random checks of the 
rate of citations showed no significant difference with the citation rate in party 
briefs.124 
Parties’ strategic bringing of cases to shape WTO jurisprudence provides 
another indicator of the AB’s intermediate authority. In many cases, 
complainants have targeted countries with smaller markets as a way to build 
precedent for future cases that involve larger economic claims.125 Similarly, a 
 
 120.  Based on authors’ calculations.  
 121.  Joost Pauwelyn, Minority Rules: Precedent and Participation Before the WTO Appellate Body, 
in JUDICIAL AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Joanna Jemielniak, Laura Nielsen & 
Henrik Palmer Olsen eds., forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 3), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=2474611. To see the use of AB citations as a network of decisions, this link provides access 
to a resource prepared by the authors: http://weboflaw.com/WTO/index.html?config=not-unified.json#.  
 122.  Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from 
Mexico, ¶¶ 62–68, WTO Doc.WT/DS344/AB/R (adopted Apr. 30, 2008). In zeroing, the United States 
sets at zero the negative differences between the prices of a product when compared to its U.S. import 
prices. Because negative amounts are excluded, this practice often results in the calculation of a margin 
and an antidumping duty in excess of the actual dumping. 
 123.  Shaffer, supra note 58, at 49.  
 124.  To review the full text of selected amicus curiae briefs submitted in ongoing and past WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings, see WTO Amicus Submissions, WORLDTRADELAW.NET, http://www. 
worldtradelaw.net/static.php?type=public&page=amicus.  
 125.  Krzysztof J. Pelc, The Politics of Precedent in International Law: A Social Network 
Application—ERRATUM, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 547, 548 (2014). 
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large subset of WTO cases involves a small amount of affected trade that alone 
would not justify the costs of litigating the case.126 One explanation for these 
cases is that the complainant wishes to set precedent for future disputes,127 thus 
implicitly recognizing that the AB wields more than narrow, case-specific 
authority. 
The AB’s interpretations of WTO texts have become part of the WTO 
acquis and, in practice, are authoritative for future disputes. They thus can 
inform settlements in the shadow of the law. A particularly telling indicator of 
the AB’s intermediate and extensive authority is where countries modify 
contemplated legislation or regulation without a dispute ever being brought. 
One practicing attorney stated that “nineteen of every twenty client matters 
involving WTO legal issues never lead to formal WTO claims, and the clear 
majority of them settle favorably.”128 For example, following other countries’ 
public complaints referencing WTO rules, the Obama Administration revised 
its signature American Recovery and Reinvestment Act during the height of 
the financial crisis,129 pursuant to which it had designed government 
procurement regulation to increase domestic employment by favoring domestic 
products. 
Although the above indicators suggest that the AB has attained at least 
intermediate authority, the AB almost immediately established extensive field-
level authority as well, reaching deep within state institutions and affecting 
perceptions of a broad array of actors regarding the existence of a field of law. 
As a result, AB decisions have broad implications for domestic institutions, 
professions, and governing norms.130 
The pressure to constrain domestic regulation in light of AB interpretations 
of WTO rules is not just external, but also can come internally because nation-
states are not monolithic entities, but rather consist of rival factions, some of 
which use WTO rules as leverage to advance their policy agendas. These actors 
within nation-states can be viewed as “trusty buddies” of the WTO when their 
interests align with trade liberalization; they mediate the global and the local.131 
Nation-states’ trade agencies interact with other agencies, and they can act as 
the overseers of not only foreign compliance with WTO rules, but also with 
domestic compliance so as to avoid WTO disputes. The U.S. Trade 
 
 126.  See Chad Bown & Kara Reynolds, Trade Flows and Trade Disputes 2 (World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 6979, July 2014),  http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/07/ 
19894128/trade-flows-trade-disputes. 
 127.  Professor Puig has also documented how these WTO decisions set precedents that may be 
persuasive to, and adopted by, tribunals outside the WTO context. Puig, supra note 64, at 37. 
 128.  Interview with private attorney in WTO practice, by telephone (July 11, 2014).   
 129.  Will Government Bailouts Lead to Trade Wars?, GLOBAL SUBSIDIES INITIATIVE, INT’L INST. 
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.iisd.org/gsi/news/will-government-bailouts-lead-
trade-wars. 
 130.  Shaffer has elsewhere assessed the broad implications of the WTO for domestic institutions, 
professions, and governing norms. Gregory Shaffer, How the WTO Shapes Regulatory Governance, 9 
REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 1 (2014), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12057/abstract. 
 131.  Id. at 5.  
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Representative plays this role in the United States, the European Commission 
in Europe, and the Indian Department of Commerce and Industry in India. The 
agencies respond to export-oriented interests catalyzed by WTO law. These 
agencies and export-oriented businesses and trade associations indirectly 
become allies of the WTO system.132 
This enrollment of domestic public and private actors affects politics in 
smaller developing countries as well. For example, the ACWL was created to 
assist developing countries in WTO disputes, and it has issued over 1,800 legal 
opinions on WTO law to developing countries since 2001; around 71% of these 
opinions were issued to its lower income (Category C) Members.133 Yet about 
one-third of its legal opinions concern the WTO compliance of the requesting 
country’s own internal measures and proposed measures, exemplifying a 
mechanism through which awareness of WTO law diffuses so as to induce 
Member compliance and avoid disputes.134 
Even in jurisdictions that do not grant WTO jurisprudence direct effect, 
national judges increasingly are aware of such jurisprudence and arguably 
attempt to conform to it when such an interpretation is permissible under 
national law. Indian courts, for example, have referred to WTO law in 
developing their antidumping jurisprudence even though India is a dualist 
jurisdiction.135 The Mexican Supreme Court has similarly used WTO–AB 
decisions to assess the consistency of Mexican law with its international 
obligations.136 A U.S. Court of International Trade judge shared that the Court’s 
judges always read WTO jurisprudence that implicates decisions within their 
jurisdiction even though their decisions must rely on U.S. law.137 
Citations by other ICs provide yet another indicator of extensive AB 
authority. In recent years, regionalism or the adoption of preferential trade 
agreements have added a new layer to international trade law. All members of 
the WTO are parties (or scheduled to become parties) to at least one of the 
 
 132.  See NITSAV CHOREV, REMAKING U.S. TRADE POLICY: FROM PROTECTIONISM TO 
GLOBALIZATION 191 (2007); Helen V. Milner, The Political Economy of International Trade, 2 ANN. 
REV. POL. SCI. 91, 95, 97 (1999) (discussing changes in trade policy preferences for domestic actors, 
including political leaders). 
 133.  Gregory Shaffer, Assessing the ACWL from a Broader Governance Perspective 3 (Minn. Legal 
Studies Research, Paper No. 11-46, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1966251. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Madhurendra Nath Jha, India: A Three-Tier Judicial Review System, in DOMESTIC JUDICIAL 
REVIEW OF TRADE REMEDIES: EXPERIENCES OF THE MOST ACTIVE WTO MEMBERS 287, 288–89 
(Müslüm Yilmaz ed., 2013). A dualist jurisdiction is one in which the international and national legal 
planes are distinct so that international law only imposes obligations in interstate relations and should 
not be directly applied by national courts. 
 136.  See, e.g., Comercio Exterior. El decreto publicado en el diario oficial de la federacion el 17 de 
agosto de 2005, que impone temporalmente una cuota arancelaria del 20% a algunos bienes originarios 
de los Estados Unidos de America, es constitucional, Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nacion [SCJN], 
Semanario Judicial de la Federacion y su Gaceta, Novena Epoca, Tomo XXVI, Septiembre de 2007, 
Tesis 1a CLXXXIX/2007, Pagina 376 (Mex.)  (referencing theUS—Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)),  
https://www.scjn.gob.mx/libreria/Decima2013Docs/XVII_FEB.pdf. 
 137.  Discussion with member of U.S. Court of International Trade, New York, NY (Oct. 2013).  
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more than 400 preferential trade agreements.138 These agreements in theory 
could weaken AB authority, but in fact, such trade agreement dispute 
settlement systems are infrequently used and when they are, adjudicators in 
charge of deciding disputes often rely on the interpretation in WTO law of 
similarly worded terms. Preferential trade agreement adjudicators’ citation to 
and common interpretation of terms such as “like products” and “less 
favourable [treatment]” reveal the influence of AB jurisprudence.139 Parties to 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for example, tend to 
litigate matters in the WTO when they have a choice, in part because it is much 
easier to stall and block the formation of a NAFTA panel. But when panels are 
formed, they cite WTO law, as in the Mexico–U.S. Cross-Border Trucking 
dispute140 and the U.S.–Canada Softwood Lumber dispute.141 Similarly, investor–
state tribunals, operating under bilateral investment treaties, cited WTO 
jurisprudence forty-one times between 2000 and 2013.142 
Beyond courts, knowledge of WTO law as a field has developed significantly 
around the world; this growth of knowledge can facilitate the internalization of 
WTO law within nation-states so that it shapes normative understandings. For 
example, think tanks with specialists on international trade law have sprouted 
in developed countries and larger emerging economies. In 2010, the WTO 
launched a new WTO Chairs Program to support research and outreach in 
developing countries. It initially launched Chairs in fourteen different 
developing countries and seven new ones were added in 2014.143 The WTO also 
offers internships in Geneva, online courses and occasional seminars, as does 
the ACWL. Thousands of people from around the world have participated in 
 
 138.  See Andreas Dür, Leonardo Baccini & Manfred Elsig, The Design of International Trade 
Agreements: Introducing a New Database, 9 REV. INT’L ORGS. 353, 357 (2014) (noting that “with the 
exception of Mongolia, all but a few tiny (island) countries have signed at least one PTA since World 
War II”). Design of Trade Agreements Database, a collaborative effort mapping international trade 
agreements and exploring causes and effects, has identified more than 600 agreements. See DESIGN OF 
TRADE AGREEMENTS DATABASE, http://www.designoftradeagreements.org/ (last visited July 12, 
2015). 
 139.  See Gabrielle Marceau, Arnau Izaguerri & Vladyslav Lanovoy, The WTO’s Influence on Other 
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: A Lighthouse in the Storm of Fragmentation, 47 J. WORLD TRADE 481, 
516, 519 (2013). 
    140. In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada: Final Affirmative Anti-
dumping Determination, Secretariat File No. USA-CDA-2002-1904-02, Decision of the Panel Following 
Remand, ¶ 2 (NAFTA Chapter 19 Binational Panel Jun. 9, 2005). 
 141.   In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services, Secretariat File No. USA-Mex-98-2008-01, 
Final Report of the Panel, ¶ 214 (North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Chapter 20 
Arbital Panel Feb. 6, 2001); cf. Sergio Puig, International Regime Complexity and Economic Law 
Enforcement, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 491, 491–516 (2014) (presenting strategies to be used by 
policymakers in combatting political maneuvering by states through procedural tactics). 
 142.  Based on authors’ calculations. See also INVESTOR-STATE LAW GUIDE, http://www.investor 
statelawguide.com/ (last visited Sep. 13, 2015) (documenting decisions by investor–state tribunals). 
 143.  In addition, as of 2013, the WTO was supporting 107 WTO Reference Centers that house 
WTO-related documentation in developing countries, including through CD-ROMs and internet 
support. See Reference Centres Programme, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/devel_e/train_e/ref_centres_e.htm (last visited July 13, 2015) (providing resources and contact 
details). 
SHAFFER_1-13 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2016  4:28 PM 
264 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79:237 
them.144 
Additionally, basic knowledge of WTO law has developed within sections of 
the private bar in many countries. This knowledge can be used not only to 
engage in WTO dispute settlement, but also in domestic policy deliberations 
and in domestic trade litigation. Brazil, India, and China, for example, have 
worked to facilitate the development of such private expertise in order to 
diffuse WTO law-related capacity. The private bar, in particular, has 
proliferated to serve clients on import relief matters permitted under WTO 
law—that is, antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguards cases.145 From 
1994 through 2012, India initiated 667 antidumping investigations, Argentina 
engaged in 352 investigations, and Brazil conducted 339 investigations.146 
Overall, developed country G20 members imposed antidumping measures that, 
between 1993 and 2009, affected around 1,200 to 2,000 product lines each year, 
reaching a peak in 2002. Developing country G20 members’ activity steadily 
rose from close to zero measures in 1994 to around 600 in 2000, 1,200 in 2004, 
and 1,600 in 2009.147 By 2011, developing country G20 members imposed a 
greater share of these measures against imports from other emerging economies 
than from high-income economies, a trend that applies not only to imports from 
China but to imports generally from emerging economies.148 
As developing countries have adopted, developed, and used these forms of 
import relief laws, the domestic profession has grown.149 This professional work 
can provide an entry point into WTO work, since around 50% of WTO cases 
since 2005 have been import relief cases. Out of the 123 Panel reports appealed 
between 1995 and 2013, around 48% of them invoked the WTO antidumping, 
 
 144.  Authors’ calculation based on Training News Archive, WORLD TRADE ORG.,  
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/archive_e/train_arc_e.htm. The WTO hired around seventy to 
eighty interns per year from 2007 through 2013. In addition, the WTO online training lists over 1,000 
people. WTO online courses attract more than a thousand developing-country participants, WORLD 
TRADE ORG., (Jan. 19, 2009), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/etraining_19jan09_e.htm. 
For a list of programs organized by the WTO, see Training News Archive, WORLD TRADE ORG.,  
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/archive_e/train_arc_e.htm.. For the programs provided by the 
ACWL, see Annual Training Course, Advisory Center on WTO Law, http://www.acwl 
.ch/e/training/annual_training_course.html. 
 145.  The WTO provides for three forms of import relief: antidumping law for when products have 
been sold at less than fair value); countervailing-duty law for when products have been subsidized, and 
safeguard measures  for when a domestic industry faces serious injury caused by a substantial increase 
in imports. ANDREW GUZMAN AND JOOST PAUWELYN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 453–519 (2d 
ed. 2012). 
 146.  Chad P. Bown, Global Antidumping Database, THE WORLD BANK (June 2015), 
http://go.worldbank.org/KR19BT5EQ0.  
 147.  Chad P. Bown, Taking Stock of Antidumping, Safeguards and Countervailing Duties, 1990–
2009, 34 THE WORLD ECON. 1955, 1978–79 (2011). 
 148.  Chad P. Bown, Emerging Economies and the Emergence of South–South Protectionism, 47 J. 
WORLD TRADE 1, 3–30 (2013).  
 149.  Cf. Mark Wu, Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 3–4 (2012) 
(discussing the growth of antidumping measures imposed by India and China, accompanied by a 
subsequent growth in proceedings).   
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subsidies, or safeguards agreements.150 
The development of WTO law as a field of academic study provides another 
indicator of the rise of extensive AB authority. The more investments made 
into institutions, firms, and careers related to WTO law, the more authoritative 
that WTO law—and the AB’s place in clarifying its meaning—can potentially 
become. A growing number of English language casebooks on GATT and 
WTO law are in circulation, from only one in the 1970s151 to around a dozen 
today. In the United States alone, 106 law professors in the American 
Association of Law Schools listed themselves as teaching (or having taught) an 
international trade law-related class in 2011.152  This expansion has been 
complemented by a growing European Law Students’ Association Moot Court 
Competition on WTO law that in its most recent and twelfth edition attracted 
more than 100 teams from all over the world.153 
Scholars form part of the broader epistemic trade law community that, in 
aiming to influence interpretation, also help to solidify it as a legal field.  Today, 
an interpretive community assesses and criticizes the reasoning of panel and AB 
decisions. Figure 3 shows the increase in articles written on WTO law over time 
as listed in the U.S. Westlaw law review database, with a significant increase in 
the second half of the 1990s, peaking in 2006. Similarly, the number of journals 
dedicated to international trade law has increased to at least around twenty-
five.154 The diffusion of this knowledge of WTO law facilitates the acceptance of 
AB authority among a broader, although specialized, community—the trade 
law field. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 150.  Authors’ own compilation based on data from WORLDTRADELAW.NET, 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2015). 
 151.  See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 
OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1977).  
 152.  Authors’ calculations based on ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH., AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW 
TEACHERS 2011–2012,  (2012),  http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/aals-directory-of-law-teachers-
2011-12.pdf. 
 153.  See ELSA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, http://elsamootcourt.elsa.org/; Corrina Muckenheim, 
Reaching Out to the World: The ELSA Moot Court Competition on WTO Law in Annex: ELSA Moot 
Court Competition (EMC2) at 464. 
 154.  For example, the Journal of International Economic Law was established in 2006, and the 
World Trade Review was first published in 2008, each complementing the earlier Journal of World 
Trade, established in 1967. Additionally, new journals are being published in countries of emerging 
economies, such as Trade, Law and Development in India, established 2008, and the Asian Journal of 
WTO and International Health Law and Policy in Taiwan, first published in 2006. For a list of 
international trade law journals, see Journal Links, WORLDTRADELAW.NET, http://www.worldtrade 
law.net/static.php?type=public&page=journals (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
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Figure 3: WTO/GATT-Related Articles in Westlaw Database155 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most broadly, WTO cases are covered to a much greater extent in world 
media than were GATT cases, helping to embed this jurisprudence as a field of 
law. WTO panel and AB decisionmaking is at times in the spotlight of 
international media on account of late-1990s civil society protests against the 
WTO and the ongoing politics of trade relations. The careful language used by 
panels and the AB in cases involving environmental and health issues, in which 
they stress the importance of environmental and health regulation, is targeted 
at these broader audiences. Government officials realize the importance of the 
audience of WTO cases. For example, a U.S. representative in the US–Cotton 
case brought by Brazil—a dispute involving subsidies provided to U.S. 
producers, users, and exporters of upland cotton—stated that “he had not fully 
realized that he was about to lose the case until his wife told him ‘that she read 
about the case in the New York Times! (. . .) at that stage I knew we would lose 
the case.”156 Similarly, in the 2006 Brazilian Presidential campaign, “the two 
main candidates argued tirelessly about which party (the Workers’ Party or 
Social Democratic Party) won more claims at the WTO.”157 
 
 155.  The authors’ methodology of the figure, which depicts articles published per year, was as 
follows: The search was conducted in Westlaw’s database of law reviews and journals on May 21, 2014 
using the search terms (1) date(year) and (2) atleast10(wto or gatt), which requires at least 10 
occurrences of the term “wto” or “gatt.” 
 156.  Manfred Elsig & Philipp Stucki, Low-Income Developing Countries and WTO Litigation: Why 
Wake Up the Sleeping Dog?, 19 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 292, 310 (2012).  
 157.  Welber Barral, UNITED NATIONS, THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 8 
n.1 (2007), http://www.cepal.org/en/publications/brazilian-experience-dispute-settlement (citing 
Carolina Glycerio, Política Externa Gera Embate Acalorado Entre Lula e Alckmin, BBCBRASIL.COM, 
Oct. 9, 2006, http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/reporterbbc/story/2006/10/061009_debatepoliticaextern 
acg.shtml. 
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that restrict trade in a similar amount, the AB’s authority is undermined and 
Members and affected private actors can lose faith in the reliability of the 
system.  Some believe that with the length of the proceedings, the increasing use 
of delay tactics, and the limitations on retrospective remedies, AB rulings do 
little to dissuade large countries like the United States and China from 
advancing policies that are contrary to WTO rules.159 
There are limits to states’ willingness to comply with AB rulings and those 
limits can affect the politics of AB interpretation, constraining the AB’s 
autonomy and power to change behavior. In rare cases, both the complainant 
and the respondent may question a decision because of its systemic 
implications. This occurred most notably in the Australia–Automotive Leather 
case.160 The United States won the case involving Australian subsidies to 
automotive leather producers and the panel issued a recommendation that 
Australia not only remove the subsidies, but that the recipient pay them back to 
the Australian government.161 Even though it won the case, the United States 
disagreed with this aspect of the ruling because it opposed the application of 
retrospective remedies in antidumping and subsidies cases, which could also be 
applied against the United States.162 No WTO panel or AB decision has since 
recommended any retrospective remedies, even though WTO rules are not 
clear on this issue, and even though weak remedies are a weak link in the 
system’s effectiveness. The rebuke, which was supported by other WTO 
Members, appears to have effectively constrained the authority of the AB in 
interpreting WTO rules to provide for stronger remedies. 
The potential response of parties to a panel or AB decision can shape these 
decisions, so that the AB’s authority is always constrained by its immediate as 
well as its broader audience. As noted earlier, in many cases, the WTO panel or 
the AB found that a country’s administrative practice, not its underlying 
national law, was WTO-inconsistent.163 These findings facilitate compliance. 
More broadly, compliance appears to be more challenging in cases involving 
regulatory policies that implicate environmental protection and social welfare.164 
 
 159.  Mark Wu, A Free Pass for China, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 
04/03/opinion/a-free-pass-for-china.html. These concerns of course, are hardly unique to the WTO. See 
generally Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach 106 
AM. J. INT’L L. 225 (2012) (discussing the relatively low prospects of success in WTO litigation). 
 160.  Panel Report, Australia—Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive 
Leather, WTO Doc. WT/DS126/RW (adopted Jan. 21, 2000). 
 161.  Id.  
 162.  See World Trade Organization, Minutes of Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of 
March 7, 2000, WTO Doc. WT/DS/M/75(2000) (“The United States did not agree with every word of 
the Panel Report. The Panel's remedy went beyond that sought by the United States.”).   
 163.  See, e.g., Panel Report, United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶¶ 7.53–7.54, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS152/R (adopted Dec. 22, 1999). See generally Sharif Bhuiyan, Mandatory and 
Discretionary Legislation under the WTO, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 571 (2002) (discussing the distinction 
between discretionary and mandatory legislation within the WTO context). 
 164.  See Thomas Sattler, Gabriele Spilker & Thomas Bernauer, Does WTO Dispute Settlement 
Enforce or Inform?, 44 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 877, 877 (2014) (finding empirical support for the argument 
that WTO dispute settlement primarily serves as an enforcement device).  
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Civil society follows WTO decisions in these areas more closely, and domestic 
pressure on respondent governments not to comply can be significant. These 
types of cases arguably have spurred a corresponding softening of WTO 
jurisprudence in this area (especially regarding GATT Article XX defenses and 
their analogues) to reduce civil society challenges to the WTO for privileging 
trade over social welfare concerns, and correspondingly to ease compliance 
prospects.165 The more AB jurisprudence moves toward accommodating 
Members’ policy choices regardless of their impact on trade, the less it 
implicates state behavior, constraining the AB’s overall power. 
Members may also recognize the AB’s formal legal authority to interpret 
WTO law but evade its impact and thus again constrain its overall power to 
meaningfully shape nation-state behavior. One tactic is “foot dragging.” The 
United States, for example, delays complying with WTO rulings, such as 
antidumping rulings, by forcing Members to litigate cases one by one, which 
enables the United States to slow changes to its practices.166 At times, such foot 
dragging can give a WTO member increased flexibility to eventually formally 
comply with an AB ruling but without any economic consequences because of 
the delay. This delay tactic often occurs in safeguards cases, in which WTO 
rules permit a Member, on certain conditions, to maintain a safeguard action 
against imports for three years without being subject to retaliation.167 Because it 
can take three years to fully litigate such WTO cases, and because there are no 
retrospective remedies for a breach, a Member can impose an illegal safeguard 
with impunity for a sustained period, as the United States did in a steel 
safeguards case that the Bush Administration adopted in 2002, with the 2004 
presidential election in mind.168 Similarly, India lost the India–Autos case against 
the United States but, in practice, was able to use the drawn-out dispute 
settlement process to continue its local content requirements to develop local 
manufacturing know-how and to enhance competitiveness in its automotive 
sector.169 Government officials contend that the policy was successful; India now 
exports cars to the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia, creating a new 
hub in regional competition with Thailand and Indonesia.170 
Another, even more troubling tactic to avoid the WTO’s impact is 
 
 165.  See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, EC—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products, ¶¶ 5.316–5.339, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R / WT/DS401/AB/R (adopted May 22, 
2014); Appellate Body Report, United States—Clove Cigarettes Measures Affecting the Production and 
Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 182, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted Apr. 4, 2012).  
 166.  SIMON A. B. SCHROPP, TRADE POLICY FLEXIBILITY AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE WTO: A 
LAW AND. ECONOMICS ANALYSIS 244n.70 (2014) (citing Appellate Body Report, United States—Final 
Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, WTO Doc. WT/DS344/AB/R (adopted Apr. 
30, 2008)).  
 167.  GUZMAN & PAUWELYN, supra note 145, at 530. 
 168.  Elizabeth Becker, In Glare of Politics, Bush Weighs Fate Of Tariffs on Steel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
20, 2003, at C1.  
 169.  Appellate Body Report, India—Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, ¶ 17, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS146/AB/R / WT/DS175/AB/R (adopted Mar. 19, 2002). 
 170.  Interview with Indian official (Jan. 18, 2010). 
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“uncompliance,” in which a Member formally complies with a ruling but adopts 
other measures that have an equivalent protectionist effect that nullifies the 
ruling’s impact. When a party formally complies but then finds another means 
to deny market access to the complaining Member, the AB lacks power to 
change behavior in a meaningful way.171 One unpublished empirical study found 
that imports to a respondent country did not typically increase following a 
successful WTO claim, a finding that might give pause to traders hoping to rely 
on the WTO dispute settlement system, especially in light of the WTO’s weak 
system of remedies.172 China in particular has been accused of adopting such 
tactics, formally complying in a way that does not result in increased imports.173 
The United States and the EU have contended that China has gone further by 
threatening to retaliate against United States and European companies that 
invest in China in order to deter the companies from providing U.S. and EU 
officials with necessary background evidence to support a claim, and to lobby 
the United States or the EU not to bring it.174 Such a tactic treats the filing of a 
legal case as a hostile political act. These tactics appear to have had some 
success, reflected in one high-level EU official’s statement at a meeting of 
business representatives that bringing a WTO case was like using a “nuclear 
weapon.”175 
The geopolitical context for WTO dispute settlement has changed since the 
WTO’s creation, which also could pose challenges for the AB’s authority. In 
particular, the BRIC nations have grown in economic importance and the 
United States and the EU have declined as economic powers. If powerful 
Members such as the United States and the EU believe that China takes 
advantage of WTO rules while engaging in policies that provide it with trade 
advantages—such as U.S. politicians’ contention that China intentionally 
intervenes in currency markets to advantage Chinese exports—then the entire 
system is at risk. If a powerful country such as the United States no longer has 
faith that the dispute settlement system can resolve trade concerns in line with 
its long-term interests, the system could unravel. 
There have been, in parallel, more aggressive challenges to AB 
interpretations. A number of antidumping practitioners in the Washington, 
D.C. trade bar, some former trade negotiators, and a former high-level 
 
 171.  See generally David J. Townsend & Steve Charnovitz, Preventing Opportunistic Uncompliance 
by WTO Members, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 437 (2011) (showing that WTO members can “uncomply” 
without facing economic consequences). 
 172.  Stephen Chaudoin, Jeffrey Kucik & Krysztof Pelc, Do WTO Disputes Actually Increase Trade? 
(Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n 2013 Ann. Meeting Paper, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2299651; cf. Chad Bown, On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, 86 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 811–23 (2004) (finding a positive, albeit very small, increase in imports following a 
dispute). 
 173.  Timothy Webster, Paper Compliance: How China Implements WTO Decisions, 35 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 525, 562 (2014). 
 174.  Interviews with former USTR official and European legal counsel (2013–2014); see also Keith 
Bradsher, Firms that Challenge China on Trade Face Cybertheft, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2014, at B1. 
 175.  Discussion with participant at such meeting, in London, U.K. (May 14, 2014). 
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secretariat member have accused the AB of “judicial activism” that has 
undermined the prospects for future negotiations.176 Although law is always 
subject to different interpretations and some of these commentators and their 
clients have stakes in that interpretation, the failure of the Doha negotiations 
(other than a marginal Trade Facilitation Agreement) shows that there is 
considerable imbalance between the WTO dispute settlement and political 
institutions. If the political system cannot correct what, in particular, powerful 
Members view as unwarranted AB interpretations, then Members may become 
disaffected or appoint less independent AB members. 
The selection process of new AB members has correspondingly become 
more politicized.177 This politicization threatens the AB’s authority by calling 
into question its judicial independence. AB Member David Unterhalter 
powerfully evoked these concerns in his January 2014 farewell speech regarding 
the threat to the independence of AB members from the appointment process 
and thus the “legitimacy and authority of the WTO dispute settlement 
system.”178  While the screening processes of candidates in Geneva and capitals 
were originally rather light and politicization was more about reputational 
effects of having a national on the AB, today WTO Members explore through 
careful screening the exact preferences and dispositions of candidates.179 This 
increased politicization became manifest in the 2013 through 2014 deadlock 
over the appointment for the successor of David Unterhalter. WTO Members 
were unable to reach consensus given that there were two African candidates 
(one Kenyan and one Egyptian) who had support from powerful WTO 
Members, and no side was willing to capitulate.180 In particular, the United 
States refused to support the candidacy of Professor James Gathii, the Kenyan 
candidate, a Chicago-based law professor who was not part of the Geneva 
diplomatic community but who otherwise appeared to have support from the 
vast majority of the membership, including the EU. In September 2014, the 
DSB finally appointed Mr. Shree Baboo Chekitan Servansing, a career 
diplomat of Mauritius without a law degree, to fill the vacant position. To the 
extent the WTO membership chooses AB members based on their sensitivity to 
diplomatic concerns rather than legal expertise, the AB’s reputation and its 
authority outside of a narrow Geneva community could decline. The resulting 
AB rulings could provide less principled guidance for future dispute settlement, 
thus also reducing the AB’s intermediate authority. 
 
 176.  See, e.g., Terence P. Stewart et al., The Increasing Recognition of Problems with WTO 
Appellate Body Decision-Making: Will the Message Be Heard? 8 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 390 
(2013); Cartland et al., supra note 78, at 989–91. 
 177.  Manfred Elsig & Mark A. Pollack, Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: Nomination and 
Appointment of Judicial Candidates in the WTO Appellate Body, 20 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 391, 393–94, 405 
(2014). 
 178.  David Unterhaler, Appellate Body Member, WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Farewell Speech 
in Geneva, CH (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/unterhalterspeech_e.htm. 
 179.  Elsig & Pollack, supra note 177, at 404–07. 
 180.  Discussion with an AB Member (Jan. 28, 2014). 
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The United States and other Members already have turned away from the 
WTO for purposes of trade negotiations, as witnessed in the proliferation of 
preferential trade agreements, particularly the negotiation of agreements 
involving significant amounts of global trade, such as the Transpacific 
Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, which 
may have their own dispute settlement mechanisms.181 Even if these treaties are 
adopted and new mechanisms are created, the WTO dispute settlement system 
could remain dominant because of the multilateral publicity it casts, which can 
more effectively induce compliance on account of broader reciprocity and 
reputational effects. However, if the United States, EU, and others turn to these 
bilateral and plurilateral dispute settlement mechanisms for disputes among 
them, this move could significantly weaken the authority of the AB. If the 
dispute settlement bodies under these agreements become more active, they 
could also increase jurisdictional conflicts over the interpretation of similar 
substantive provisions. 
Data presented earlier on public interest in the WTO measured by proxies 
such as output of the academic community (Figure 2) and participation by 
private actors in the WTO Public Forum (Figure 3) shows signs of declining 
public interest. Although these changes might relate to the lack of progress in 
the Doha Round negotiations, they also raise questions regarding the WTO’s 
and AB’s larger public profiles. If they decline, so may the AB’s extensive 
authority. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
The WTO AB’s rapid development of extensive authority is a unique case in 
international politics at the multilateral level. Contrary to most assumptions, 
the AB shows how the development of IC authority is not necessarily 
evolutionary, going through progressive stages from narrow authority (between 
litigants) to intermediate authority (before a similarly situated group) to 
extensive field-level authority (before a broader audience of government 
officials, other courts, legal professionals, business associations, civil society 
organizations, and academics). The establishment of extensive AB authority 
represents a legalization leap in which international dispute settlement moved 
rapidly, and almost instantaneously, from limited narrow authority under the 
GATT to significantly more expansive authority. 
 
 181.  FINAL REPORT, U.S.–EU HIGH LEVEL WORKING GROUP, FINAL 
REPORT JOBS AND GROWTH 6 (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/02132013%20 
FINAL%20HLWG%20REPORT.pdf; U.S., EU Announce Decision to Launch Negotiations on a 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE (Feb. 13, 2013), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/ 
2013/february/statement-US-EU-Presidents. Since 2008, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement has 
been under negotiation by Australia, Brunei, Chile, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. IAN E. FERGUSSON & BRUCE VAUGHN, THE 
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 1 (2011), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40502.pdf. 
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The AB’s authority, although extensive, nonetheless remains fragile. The 
WTO is still an interstate dispute settlement system, so private parties have no 
direct access to the AB. The AB thus directly confronts state pressure and at 
times shapes its decisions to facilitate Member compliance with them. The AB 
appears to be under greater pressure today than at any other time in the WTO’s 
history. States created the AB and they can also undermine it, especially 
powerful ones such as the United States. Although the AB still enjoys 
significant power to shape state behavior, its authority is threatened by major 
geopolitical shifts, such as the rise of China as an economic power, the failures 
of the WTO negotiating process and Members’ corresponding turn to other 
treaties for trade negotiations that provide potential new fora for dispute 
settlement, and accusations from the United States—in particular, of AB 
“judicial activism” that appears to be aimed at curtailing the AB’s authority. 
For the moment, AB authority is extensive. But just as the AB’s authority 
rapidly and almost instantaneously rose, so it could rapidly fall. AB members 
appear to be conscious of the limits of their authority and have shaped their 
jurisprudence to ease Members’ concerns. But even while they have some 
agency to induce compliance and reliance on the system, broader structural 
changes and potential U.S. disenchantment could pose deeper challenges to the 
AB’s authority, which shows signs of decline. 
 
